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NOTES
CIVIL LAW PROPERTY - ALLUVION - DISTINGUISHING LAKES.
FROM RIVERS AND STREAMS
The classification of a body of water as a river, stream, or
lake has important consequences in Louisiana property law. Ac-
cording to the Louisiana Civil Code "accretions formed succes-
sively and imperceptibly to any soil situated on the shore of a
river or other stream, are called alluvion, which belongs to the
owner of the soil situated on the edge of the water, whether it
be a river or stream, and whether the same be navigable or not."'
(Emphasis added.) Since this article does not refer to lakes, the
question immediately arises whether the rules of accretion apply
to such bodies of water.
French Civil Code articles 556 and 557 are almost identical
with the corresponding Louisiana Civil Code articles dealing
with alluvion and dereliction. 2 However, French Civil Code
article 558, which has no counterpart in the Louisiana Civil
Code, provides that the laws regarding alluvion do not apply to
lakes.3 Assuming the omission was deliberate, it may signify
the intent of the draftsmen to change the French rule. On the
other hand, they may have thought a specific exclusion of lakes
from the rules of accretion and dereliction was unnecessary since
articles 509 and 510 by their terms apply only to rivers and
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 509 (1870).
2. Compare FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 556, 57, with LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 509,
10 (1870). LA. CIVIL CODE art. 510 (1870) provides that "the same rule [that
contained in art. 509; see text at note 1 supra] applies to derelictions formed by
running water retiring imperceptibly from one of its shores and encroaching on
the other."
There is a slight difference between articles 556 of the French Civil Code and
509 of the Louisiana Civil Code. The former applies to fleuve8 and rivieres, which
may be translated as rivers and creeks. Originally, the French draft of the Louisi-
ana Civil Code of 1808 read the same; this was carried forth in the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1825. However, in the 1870 revision, the wording was changed to
"river(s) and other stream(s)." See text at note 1 supra. It is at least arguable
that the change in wording was intended to broaden the application of article 509
to bodies of water which might be considered lakes, but through which a current
runs. See 3 LoUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES
OF LOUISIANA, PART I 291 (1940).
3. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 558 (Cachard's transl. 1930) : "Alluvion does not
take place in connection with lakes and ponds, of which the owner always retains
the land covered by the water when it reaches the level of the outlet of the pond,
even if the volume of water should decrease.
"On the other hand, the owner of a pond does not acquire any right to the
riparian lands which the water covers in cases of extraordinary rise."
[554]
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streams. However, regardless of the purpose of the omission,
the jurisprudence is settled that Louisiana Civil Code article 509
applies only to rivers and streams, not to lakes.4 The crucial
question in the cases has been whether a particular body of
water is to be classified as a lake, or as a river or stream, and
what test should be employed to make the classification.
The Louisiana Supreme Court first encountered the question
in State v. Erwin,5 a case considering Calcasieu Lake, a large
expanse of water through which the Calcasieu River flows. One
of the holdings in the Erwin case was that the better view was
to.regard vast expanses of water, such as Calcasieu Lake, as a
lake even though a river empties into it and flows through it
into the sea." No authority was given for the holding. It is in
direct conflict with the French law under which a body of water
through which a river flows, though called a lake, is deemed, in
the application of the laws governing alluvion, a section of the
river.7 Other aspects of State v. Erwin were overruled in Miami
Corp. v. State," but no light was shed on the characteristics dis-
tinguishing a lake from a river or stream.
Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. State Mineral Bd.9 involved a
narrow arm of Grand Lake. The court indicated that a lake does
not imply a body of water in which a current flows, but a body
of water, more or less stagnant, in which the water is supplied
from drainage. In rainy seasons drainage would increase, and
hence the level of the water would rise and a current could form.
A river was said to be distinguished from a lake in that it flows
4. See Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Jones, 233 La. 915, 98 So. 2d 236 (1957);
Doiron v. O'Bryan, 218 La. 1069, 51 So. 2d 628 (1951) ; State v. Aucoin, 206 La.
787, 20 So. 2d 136 (1944) ; Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 203
La. 473, 14 So. 2d 61 (1943) ; Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315
(1936) ; State v. Erwin, 173 La. 507, 138 So. 84 (1931) ; Bank of Coushatta v.
Yarborough, 139 La. 510, 71 So. 784 (1916) ; Slattery v. Arkansas Natural Gas
Co., 138 La. 793, 70 So. 806 (1916) ; Sapp v. Frazier, 51 La. Ann. 1718, 26 So.
378 (1899) ; Zeller v. Southern Yacht Club, 34 La. Ann. 837 (1882).
5. 173 La. 507, 138 So. 84 (1931).
6. Id. at 513-14, 138 So. at 86.7. See, e.g., 25 FUZIER-HERMAN, REPERT'IRE DU DROIT FRANQAIS 783 (1896).
8. 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1936). By applying LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 450
and 453 (1870), the court in Miami decided that the bed of a navigable body of
water belongs to the state. Therefore the court found it unnecessary to consider
the applicability of articles 509 and 510.
. 9. 203 La. 473, 14 So. 2d 61 (1943). The arm of Grand Lake, being a part of
the Atchafalaya River, consisting of running water, and possessing all the char-
acteristics of a river in its ability to remove and deposit soil, was held to be a
stream within the meaning of the code article defining alluvion as accretions
formed successively and imperceptibly on the shore of a river or other stream.
See text at note 1 supra.
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with a current, more or less, in a permanent bed or channel be-
tween defined banks or walls, whereas streams are bodies of
flowing water including rivers. Applying these definitions, the
court concluded that a river or other stream is distinguished
from a lake by the power of a stream or river to remove and
deposit soil so as to form accretions along its shores.10
Subsequently, in Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Jones," the court
applied the Amerada test to Deer Park Bend. The court held
that a body of water does not have to flow continuously to be
classified as a stream. The current in Deer Park Bend was ca-
pable of carrying alluvion and depositing it along its banks.
This satisfied the definition of a stream and prevented Deer
Park Bend from being classified as a lake or pond.12
Thus all jurisprudence prior to the recent case of State v.
Cockrell,13 with the exception of Erwin, indicates that a body of
water is a river or stream if the water moves, even though it
does not flow constantly, and if it has the power to carry silt
and form alluvion. 14 It should be noted that in Erwin a wide
expanse of water was involved, whereas in Amerada and Esso
relatively small and narrow bodies of water were in contro-
versy. 5 Consequently, it may be inquired whether the same test
applies to vast expanses of water such as that involved in Erwin.
In State v. Cockrell, the first case involving a large expanse of
water since Erwin, the First Circuit Court of Appeal apparent-
ly ignored the possibility that the test could be different, and
simply applied the Amerada test. 6 The court indicated that
Erwin had been overruled by Amerada.
There is doubt, however, whether the court relied solely on
10. Id. at 495, 14 So. 2d at 68-69.
11. 233 La. 915, 98 So. 2d 236 (1957).
12. Id. at 938, 98 So. 2d at 244.
13. 162 So. 2d 361 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
14. See Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Jones, 233 La. 915, 98 So. 2d 236 (1957);
Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 203 La. 473, 14 So. 2d 61 (1943)
State v. Erwin, 173 La. 507, 138 So. 84 (1931).
15. In Erwin Calcasieu Lake varied from 41/2 to 12 miles in width. The arm
of Grand Lake in Amerada was 4,400 feet wide opposite the property in contro-
versy, and Deer Park Bend in Esso was a narrow channel formed when the Mis-
sissippi River changed its course.
16. 162 So. 2d at 368. In Cockrell the water involved covered an expanse of
three miles at the site of the accretion in controversy. The expanse of water is
known as Six Mile Lake, and it forms a portion of the Atchafalaya River Basin.
The Atchafalaya River loses its identity as a river at a point above Six Mile
Lake, and flows through a network of smaller waterways of which Six Mile Lake
is a part. Below Six Mile Lake, the Atchafalaya River regains its identity, the
network of intervening waterways uniting to form one continuous river.
(Vol .xxv
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the Amerada test in reaching its conclusion that Six Mile Lake
was a stream, for the court went beyond the evidence of current
sufficient to carry alluvion and considered other geological char-
acteristics presented by experts as being typical of streams as
opposed to lakes. 17 Among these traits were the winding, ser-
pent-like course and the changing, sinuous bank line of Six Mile
Lake; the absence of peat moss deposits, which are found in
lakes; the presence of a channel and "V"-shaped basin of Six
Mile Lake; and the lack of wave action which causes erosion,
beaches, headlands, and cliffs along lakes.' On the other hand,
this evidence may have been considered simply to show that
there was sufficient current to carry alluvion.' 9 Whether the
court considered these factors independent criteria or further
substantiation of the presence of current, is not clear from the
opinion.
If the criterion for classification of large bodies of water is
to be the mere capacity to carry alluvion, there seems to be a
practical problem in its application. Suppose that instead of an
entire body of water having a current, as in Cockrell, a river
flows into a large expanse of water producing a current suffi-
cient to move and deposit alluvion along the west bank, but the
water along the east bank is more or less stagnant and deposits
no alluvion. Or suppose a river enters and flows down the mid-
dle of the large body of water with sufficient current to carry
and deposit alluvion, while the water along the shore is relative-
ly stagnant. Would the fact that even a small portion of the
body of water has a current be sufficient to classify the whole
17. Id. at 369. If the court was willing simply to apply the test set forth in
the Amerada and Esso cases, the question why the court went into a detailed con-
sideration of the evidence introduced in Cockrell immediately arises. Was the
court setting forth additional tests besides the power and capacity of a body of
water to carry alluvion? Or did the court merely enter into a detailed considera-
tion of the evidence establishing the physical characteristics of Six Mile Lake to
show that this body of water had sufficient current to carry alluvion?
18. Id. at 369-70. From a geological point of view, the serpent-like, winding
characteristic, the absence of peat moss deposits on the water bottom, the "V'-
shaped basin, and the lack of wave action in Six Mile Lake all indicated that it
was not a lake.
Lakes in the Louisiana Coastal Region all have typical saucer-shaped basins,
whereas the "V"-shaped basin is characteristic of a body of running water. The
latter shape results from the current eating away at the bottom. Likewise, be-
cause of the current in running bodies of water, peat moss does not form on the
bottoms; on the other hand, peat moss is generally found on the bottom of lakes.
Wave action in lakes will generally produce erosion, beaches, headlands and cliffs
along the shore, but in running bodies of water, the current will wash away the




body of water as a river or stream in these situations? These
questions are truly confusing if we simply rely on the test set
forth in Amerada and Esso.
The geological characteristics which the court considered in
Cockrell could be the answer to these complex problems. Instead
of the flat statement that a body of water is a river or stream if
it has the power to carry and deposit alluvion, this decision
makes possible the use of expert testimony and physical evi-
dence. It is submitted that the law regarding alluvion and the
difficulty of characterizing a body of water as a river or stream
will be greatly simplified should the Supreme Court accept the
geological characteristics dealt with in Cockrell.
Kenneth E. Gordon, Jr.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION - STATE
REGULATION OF LEGAL PROFESSION
The Virginia State Bar sued under state legislation to enjoin
the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and others from engag-
ing in a legal aid program alleged to constitute unauthorized
practice of law and solicitation of legal business.' Under the
program, the United States was divided into sixteen regions and
a local lawyer or firm was selected by the Brotherhood in each
region as the most competent counsel to settle personal injury
suits of union members. When a worker was injured or killed,
the secretary of his local lodge would visit him or his family and
urge that the claim not be settled without prior legal advice, and
that in the Brotherhood's judgment the best lawyer to consult
was the regional counsel recommended by it.2 The result of the
plan was to channel substantially all of the personal injury cases
1. Suit was instituted pursuant to 2 VA. CODE 619 (1950); 171 Va. xviii
(1938), wherein the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals virtually promulgated
the American Bar Association's Canons of Ethics into official Rules of Court in
accordance with the authority granted by statute. See VA. CODE §§ 54-42-54.83.1
(1950).
2. A great deal of uncertainty surrounds the actual relationships of attorney,
client, and union in the principal case. In the past, the union official who con-
tacted the injured had received a substantial gratuity from the lawyer involved;
it also appears that the attorney paid for free trips offered to the injured, that
he might consult with the attorney in question before signing a contract. Often
the injured was shown a photostatic copy of checks previously recovered. See
In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958).
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